Russell's
Paradox
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) constructed
a famous paradox (an "antinomy") to persuade the mathematical world that
in developing consistent systems (systems in which every statement is either
true or false), familiarity and intuitive clarity are not solid bases.
The argument goes on like this:
-
There are sets than contain themselves (examples:
"the set of all objects that can be described with exactly thirteen
words", "the set of all thinkable things")
-
Therefore, a set either contains itself or not.
Let's call a set "non-normal" in the first case and "normal" in the second
-
Let N be the collection of all normal sets,
which of course, is itself a set
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Question: is N normal?
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If N is normal, then by definition of "normality"
it does not contain itself. But N contains by construction all normal sets
therefore itself too (contradiction)
-
If N is not normal, then by definition of "non-normality"
N is itself a member of N. But by construction, any member of N is a normal
set (contradiction too)
-
Conclusion: the statement "N is normal" is neither
true nor false
This particular paradox is analogous to the
contradictions found when examining infinite sets. Gödel's work led
to the realization that such "antinomies" are unavoided and so the mathematical
Holy Grail of complete consistent systems is an impossibility.
Kurt Gödel Page
Famous Problems
and Proofs Main Page